Abstract. In this paper, we propose two cryptosystems based on group rings and existing cryptosystem. First one is Elliptic ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem whose security is greater than security of cryptosystems based on elliptic curves discrete logarithmic problem (ECDLP). Second is ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem, which is analogous to ElGamal public key cryptosystem but has comparatively greater security. Examples are also given for both the proposed cryptosystems.
Introduction
Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques for achieving Privacy, Authentication, Integrity and Non-repudiation, i.e. PAIN. For the secrecy and authenticity of sensitive information, cryptosystems are used extensively. The one and only aim of these cryptosystems is to ensure end-to-end communication between two or more parties such that the information encrypted at one end is understood only at the other end. For end-to-end secure communication, various symmetric ciphers have been developed till 1970's, for instance, classical substitution ciphers, transposition ciphers, rotor machines (see [11] ) etc. Since then many symmetric ciphers came in the picture but security-wise some of the best known are DES and AES both based on the concepts of confusion and diffusion introduced by Claude Shannon [12] , however, in the current scenario DES is no longer in use because the key length does not withstand against the brute force attack.
One of the greatest revolution in cryptography is the development of asymmetric or public key cryptography. Some of the well known public key cryptosystesms or ciphers are RSA, ElGamal, NTRU (see [9, 11] ) etc. The security of most of the public key cryptosystems depend on the hardness of solving some underlying mathematical problem with a trapdoor like integer factorization, discrete logarithmic, shortest non-zero vector in the lattice etc. and most of these problems arise in number theory [9] . Combinatorial group theory has also attracted much interest for the construction of public key cryptosystems [1, 2, 4] . The hard underlying mathematical problem associated with most of these cryptosystems is conjugacy search problem which can be considered as the generalization of discrete logarithm problem to groups other than F p where p is some prime. During the recent years, elliptic curves over finite fields have drawn the attention of many researchers, see [6, 7] . The interesting problem of adding two points on an elliptic curve was a very subtle issue and theory behind it leads to the fascinating field of mathematics known as Algebraic Geometry. For additional reading devoted to elliptic curve cryptography, see [13, 14] . To the best of our knowledge, algebraic structure known as group rings has not been used in cryptography upto first decade of 21 st century. Hurley [15] discussed the various applications of group rings to the areas of communication. In [5] , the first known symmetric key cryptosystem using group rings was demonstrated with few examples which show how to combine RSA and unit of group ring and how to use large power of a unit as a public key but no public key cryptosystem was discussed explicitly.
In this paper, we discuss two novel group rings based public key cryptosystems. First one is Elliptic Elgamal type group ring public key cryptosystem and second one is ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem without the involvement of Elliptic curves. Elliptic ElGamal public key cryptosystem which is analogous to ElGamal is discussed in [9] . The main difficulty with this cryptosystem is non-obvious way of attaching the plaintext messages and elements of elliptic curve over finite field. We try to resolve this problem in our work by combining the elements of group ring with that of elliptic curves in a unique manner. The sounding effect of these proposed public key cryptosystems is their enhanced security in comparison to that of existing cryptosystems. This enhanced security can be well understood for traditional classical computers but in the coming era of quantum computers where public key cryptosystems (in particular, RSA, ECDSA) are no longer safe [16, 18, 19] , this can play a vital role because of the involvement of two operations in group ring which are connected via distributive law.
Rest of the paper is designed as follows: Section 2 pertains to preliminary definitions and discussion of both the novel cryptosystems. Examples related to these schemes are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 is related to discussion of availability of units of group rings and last section comprises some concluding remarks.
Cryptographic systems in group rings
In the present section, we propose two public key cryptosystems in group rings. But before that, we provide some preliminary definitions and results requisite for our work.
Definition 2.1. Group Ring: Let R be a ring with unity and G be a group. The set
of all finite sums is known as group ring. As name suggests, RG is a group, ring, and module over R. See [10] for more information on group rings. For a, b ∈ RG, a * b denotes the product of a and b. Definition 2.2. Unit of a group ring: Let u ∈ RG. This u is a unit of RG if there exists an element v ∈ RG such that
Set of all units of RG forms a group under the operation * . Definition 2.3. Normalized unit of a group ring: Let u = k i=1 α i g i ∈ RG with α i ∈ R and g i ∈ G be a unit of RG. This u is said to be normalized if
Set denoted by V (RG) of all the normalized units of RG forms a group under the operation * .
Definition 2.4. Discrete Logarihtmic Problem (DLP): Let g, h be two elements of F p such that h is some power of g. Then DLP is the problem of finding an integer n such that h = g n . Definition 2.5. Discrete Logarihtmic Problem (DLP) in group ring: Let u be an element of RG and v be another element of RG which is some power of u. Then, DLP in group ring is determination of an integer x such that v = u x . Definition 2.6. Elliptic Curve: Consider the Weierstrass equation
Set of all the solutions of E together with an extra point O that lives at infinity is an elliptic curve. Here R and S are constants which satisfy 4R 3 + 27S 2 = 0.
Further, if we consider only those elements of E which also belong to F p × F p , then the set
is an elliptic curve over the finite field F p with R, S ∈ F p . Definition 2.7. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarihtmic Problem (ECDLP): Let P, Q be two points on elliptic curve E(F p ). Then ECDLP is the problem of determination of an integer n such that Q = nP , provided such an integer exists.
Next, we give the explicit formulas to add and subtract any two points on an elliptic curve.
For proof see [9, Theorem 5.6 ].
Theorem 2.1. Let P and Q be any two points on the elliptic curve E(F p ).
(2) Otherwise, write P = (x 1 , y 1 ) and Q = (x 2 , y 2 ).
Then P + Q = (x 3 , y 3 ) with
Now, we discuss the important task of associating each data or number to be encrypted with the elements of group ring RG where R is the ring with identity and G = {g 1 , g 2 , · · · } is either finite or countable group. In our study, we either consider R = F p for some prime p > 0 or R = Z.
2.1.
Connection between given data and elements of group ring. Suppose that all the digits of the data to be encrypted are elements of R, for instance, data consists of elements ranging from 0 to p − 1 for some prime p and R = Z p . Given any arbitrary data, write it in blocks of length t where t ∈ Z + . Further, any arbitrary data block m = m 1 m 2 · · · m t with m i ∈ R can be considered as an element of group ring RG via the following representation
For above representation to be unique, order of G must be atleast t and therefore we assume the same, i.e. |G| ≥ t and can be atmost countable. If length of the message is not a multiple of t, then padding can be done with 0 ′ s.
2.2.
Elliptic ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem. Given a message r = t i=1 m i g i , write it uniquely as a row vector
where m i is the coefficient of element g i in r. Choose a point P = (x 1 , y 1 ) on the elliptic curve E(F p ) and a unit u of group ring RG such that order of u is large. This unit is not made public.
Further, secretly choose two positive integers (n 1 , n 2 ) and use these integers to compute
where A ∈ RG. Set (P, Q, A) as the public key for encryption and (n 1 , u −n 2 ) as the private key for decryption. Now select a random one time key n 3 and let n 3 Q = (x 3 , y 3 ). This key is used for encrypting only one message or some fixed number of blocks that needs to be decided in the beginning and then discarded.
2.2.1. Encryption. For encryption, message r is encrypted using public key to obtain the ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 ) where
where the ⊕ operation is defined as
and since m i , x i , y i ∈ F p , above addition is defined. Rationale behind the ⊕ operation is to combine an element of group ring with an element of elliptic curve such that the result is an element of group ring. So, the ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 ) has two parts where C 1 is the element of elliptic curve and C 2 is the element of group ring. This ciphertext is then send to the receiver say Alice. Remark 2.2. Suppose that the operation ⊕ is of the form
where we are adding x 3 + y 3 in every message digit. This added block can leak some information about the message if there are consecutive zeros in the message. To avoid such a situation we added the multiples of (x 3 , y 3 ) in the message digits.
2.2.2.
Decryption. Since Alice knows u −n 2 , she computes
Alice also knows n 1 and she use this to obtain
Thereafter, she computes the multiples of n 3 Q and perform the decryption operation ⊖, i.e.
where ⊖ operation means subtracting x 3 + y 3 , x 4 + y 4 , · · · , x t+2 + y t+2 from the corresponding elements of row vector.
Remark 2.3. We can also consider R = Z in Elliptic ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem in place of F p . In that case, whole encryption scheme remains same with the only difference that operation ⊕ involves usual addition instead of addition modulo p.
Remark 2.4. For Elliptic ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem, we can also consider fields of different characteristics. For instance, we can consider E(F p ) and R = Z q where p and q are some primes. If p < q, then the operation ⊕ involves addition modulo q and we directly add the elements of elliptic curves to that of group ring. If p > q, then first we need to convert the elements of elliptic curve to elements modulo q and then apply operation ⊕ which again involves addition modulo q. An example related to this situation is discussed in Section 3.
Logic behind the name. Proposed encryption scheme is a novel approach involving the important operation of combining the elements of a group ring with those of Elliptic curve. The parameters involved are similar to ElGamal and hence the cryptosystem is named as Elliptic
ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem.
2.2.4.
Security of the scheme. To obtain the plaintext from ciphertext, adversary in between needs to:
(1) solve ECDLP.
(2) determine inverse of power a unit or unit from its power.
In F * p , there are algorithms for solving DLP and the fastest known algorithm has subexponential running time known as index calculus method [9] . But there are no such algorithms for solving ECDLP. The fast known algorithm takes approximately √ p times to solve ECDLP (for example Pollard's ρ method [9] ), i.e. to say that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve ECDLP. 
This ciphertext is then send to Alice.
2.3.2. Decryption. As the second part n 2 of private key is known to Alice, she finds (C 1 ) −n 2 and use this to obtain
On multiplying above with A −1 1 (first part of private key), Alice gets the message r.
2.3.3.
Security of the scheme. To obtain plaintext from the ciphertext, Eve needs private key, i.e. n 2 and A
−1
1 which requires the determination of unit from its power and inverse of a given unit respectively. In other words, Eve's first task is to solve the DLP in group ring which is much harder than DLP in groups because a group ring involve two operations connected via distributive law whereas a group involves only one operation. So far there is no threat to DLP from classical computers for properly chosen groups which means DLP in group rings is also safe.
But there exist quantum algorithms to solve DLP in finite groups, however, nothing is known to solve DLP in group rings or non-abelian groups [19] . Therefore, we can say that DLP in group rings is much harder than DLP in groups, even in quantum word. Hardness of Eve's second task, i.e. inverse computation problem is already discussed in Subsection 2.2.4. Therefore, we conclude that ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem is much more secure than the existing ElGamal cryptosystem.
Remark 2.5. For ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem, R can be ring of integers also. In that case too, we write the message in blocks of length t with |G| ≥ t. Example involving integral group ring is discussed in next section.
Examples
In this section, we discuss some examples of the group ring public key cryptosystems defined in the preceding section. From now onwards, we write GRPKC as a short form for group ring public key cryptosystem. Most of the results including determination of units, computation of powers of units and their corresponding inverses can be obtained using GAP (Groups, Algorithm and Programming) [17] , MAGMA or MATLAB.
Elliptic ElGamal type GRPKC. For the better understanding of Elliptic ElGamal
type GRPKC, we give a simple example by considering the small parameters. Suppose that the message m of arbitrary size consists of only English alphabets (this restriction is made only for understanding), let's say {A, B, · · · , Z}. So, we map these alphabets on the elements of F 29 by the mapping
Suppose the message is "ARMY". We consider G = C 29 = < g >, i.e. cyclic group of order 29.
In terms of element of group ring, we write the message in the form r = 0e + 17g + 12g 2 + 24g 3 = 0 17 12 24 .
Consider the elliptic curve E(F 29 ) : y 2 = x 3 + 4x + 20 mod 29
and a point P = (8, 10) on it. We consider the trivial unit g of F 29 G and choose the private key
. Public key is (P, Q, A) where
Let n 3 = 3 and using Theorem 2.1, we get Now Alice use first part n 1 of her private key to obtain
and multiples of (3, 28) . Clearly Alice needs to compute only 4 multiples of (3, 28) We have chosen trivial unit for this example so that it can be done manually. In the upcoming examples, we consider non-trivial units which actually make the scheme worthy. Above yields
Elliptic ElGamal type GRPKC for
Therefore the ciphertext is (C 1 , C 2 ). Decryption can be done similarly as shown in subsection 3.1. Clearly, this example shows the beautiful mixing of points of elliptic curve and the message.
Now we discuss an example as said in Remark 2.4.
3.3.
Elliptic ElGamal type GRPKC for R = F 2 and G = D 10 . We assume that message is in bits or in other words R = F 2 , G is Dihedral group of order 10 with the same representation considered in last example. Clearly, the group ring RG has 1024 elements. Consider the element u = r 2 + r 4 + s of RG. It can be verified that u is a unit of RG with inverses
Rest of the setting including choice of elliptic curve, selection of point P on elliptic curve, public key and private key is exactly same to the one considered in last example. So, the private and public keys are (10, u −8 ) and (P, Q, A) respectively where
Let n 3 = 5 and using Theorem 2.1 we can get the multiples of n 3 Q as done in last example. 
Above yields
Therefore the ciphertext is (C 1 , C 2 ). For decryption, Alice first of all use the second part of her private key to get C 2 * A −1 . Now Alice use first part n 1 of her private key to obtain n 1 C 1 = (180, 115) and its multiples. Clearly Alice needs to compute only 10 multiples of (180, 115) which is decided by the length of group. These multiples are then added to C 2 * A −1 under modulo 2 to get the original message.
Now we discuss some examples for the feel of ElGamal GRPKC. All the three examples discussed above involve small parameters, but for the practical implementation of these schemes, we need to work with large numbers or in other words, large power of units. In the next example, we take care of this thing and consider large (reasonably) parameters.
3.4.
ElGamal type GRPKC for an abelian group. Let r = 11110100001 is the message, R = F 2 and G is cyclic group of order 11, i.e.
and we denote g i = g i . Clearly, the group ring RG has 2048 elements. Given message as an element of group ring is
Take a unit u = 1 + g + g 3 (verify that u −1 = 1 + g + g 3 + g 6 + g 7 + g 8 + g 10 ) having order 1023 and calculate
Further, choose another unit 
Using public key the obtained ciphertext with ephemeral key k = 19 is (C 1 , C 2 ) where is the message to be encrypted. In terms of element of group ring, r can be written as
Here we choose small parameters otherwise the expressions becomes so large to print here but one can choose arbitrary large numbers. Consider the element u = 2e
of RG. It can be verified that u is a unit of RG with u −1 = 2e − x + x 3 − x 4 + x 5 − x 7 having infinite order. Take n 1 = 2 and calculate
Further, consider another unit
of RG and secret positive integer n 2 = 2. Public key is (A 1 , A 2 , v) where
and private key is (A −1 1 , 2). Using public key the obtained ciphertext with ephemeral key k = 1 is (C 1 , C 2 ) where C 1 = v and
After obtaining the ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 ), Alice computes (C 2 * v −2 ) * u −1 using her private key to obtain the message.
We end this section by giving an example in which we set a public key which is multiplication of Bass cyclic unit and Bicyclic unit of integral group ring. This public key or unit has an advantage that it is not of the known type and therefore it becomes computationally infeasible to obtain the inverse of such a unit.
3.6. ElGamal type GRPKC for R = Z and G = S 5 . Let RG be the integral group ring with G = S 5 , i.e. symmetric group of degree 5. We denote G = {g i , 0 ≤ i ≤ 119} (for any order of our choice) and consider the message blocks of length 120 for encryption. Now before the setting of public key, we recall the definitions of Bass cyclic and Bicyclic units.
Definition 3.1. Bass cyclic unit: Let g be an element of a group G having order n. Choose an integer i coprime to n such that 1 < i < n − 1. Then the element
is a unit of integral group ring RG. Here φ(n) denotes the Euler's totient function and
Definition 3.2. Bicyclic unit: Let g, h be two elements of a group G such that |g| = n. Then the element
is a bicyclic unit of integral group ring RG corresponding to g and h whereĝ has the same meaning as in Definition 3.1.
For additional reading on these units see [10] . Let g = (1 4 2 5 3) be an element of S 5 having order 5 and i = 3. Then the Bass cyclic unit x corresponding to g and i is After obtaining the ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 ), Alice can easily obtain the message.
Units of group rings using GAP
Both the encryption schemes of proposed cryptosystems involve units of group rings and therefore in this section we discuss about the units of group rings. There are only few recipes for the construction of units but still a vast literature is available on units of group rings. Using LAGUNA package of GAP [3] , group V (RG) of normalized units of group algebra RG with R = F p for some prime p > 0 and a finite p-group can be computed efficiently for smaller sizes of RG. Further, as the unit group U (RG) of RG is F * p × V (RG) which means we can efficiently compute the complete unit group. But with the increase in size of |G|, GAP is very inefficient, for instance, the computation of number of elements and generators of normalized unit group of V (F 5 G) where G is a cyclic group of order 5 5 takes 38 minutes (approx) and program may crash for groups of size greater than 5000. Despite of this drawback, GAP still covers a large class of unit groups. For finite groups other than p-groups, units can be obtained using the Wedderga package of GAP [8] with the additional restrictions that R is semisimple and |G| is invertible in R. Basically Wedderga package is not for the calculation of units directly. Its main purpose is to find the Wedderburn decomposition [10] of a group algebra. From this wedderburn decomposition, we can easily obtain the structure of unit groups. Without the use of LAGUNA and Wedderga we can also generate the units of integral group rings as well as any modular group ring using GAP.
Conclusion
From security point of view, we already discussed that both the proposed cryprosystems have greater security than that of existing cryptosystems. In the coming era of Quantum computers, this enhanced security would play a great role because no such quantum algorithm is known to solve DLP in group rings. Novelty of this work is the involvement of group rings and their units in the field of public key cryptography. As mentioned there is a huge literature available on the structure of unit group of group rings but very few articles are there in which unit group is computed explicitly in terms of elements of group ring. Since the latter is more important for frequent use of group rings in cryptography, much more efforts are required for the explicit representation of the unit group in terms of the elements of group ring.
